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Introduction
Behaviour in many studies does not correspond to a Nashequilibrium, in particular in one-shot games and early rounds of repeated games (Crawford et al., 2013) . One of the main contestant models to account for unexperienced behaviour is the level-k model. In fact, it is the only model that has been shown to be able to account for behaviour in the hide-and-seek games presented in Rubinstein and Tversky (1993) , Rubinstein et al. (1997) , and Rubinstein (1999) . In the archetype version of this game, a ''hider'' possesses a ''treasure'' she can hide in one of four boxes, labelled ''A'', ''B'', ''A'', and ''A''. A ''seeker'' may open one of these boxes. If the seeker chooses the same box as the hider, the seeker gains the treasure, otherwise the hider keeps it. The typical choice distribution from experiments on the game differs markedly from the unique Nash prediction, uniform mixing by both players. The typical data set has a strong mode on ''central A'' for both roles, E-mail address: wolff@twi-kreuzlingen.ch. being even more pronounced for seekers than for hiders (which leads to a substantial seeker-advantage relative to equilibrium). 1 Crawford and Iriberri (2007, henceforth CI) show that a levelk model anchored on a salience-seeking level-0 accounts for the observed data once the model is based on a specific saliencepattern. In this pattern, the ''end As'' are the most and ''central A'' the least salient locations. Hargreaves Heap et al. (2014) test the salience-based level-k model on a more general level and show that it cannot account simultaneously for data from hide-andseek games, coordination games, and discoordination games if we assume that level-0 is the same for all games played on the same action-set frame. While Hargreaves Heap et al.'s paper casts doubt on the generalisability of the model, it does not address whether the model is a plausible explanation for the hide-and-seek data. To test whether this is the case, I measure salience in nine different ways, base CI's level-k model on the measured salience-patterns, and test whether any of the resulting models allows to explain the hide-and-seek data.
The salience-elicitation experiments
I examine nine experimental measures of salience. The point of this exercise is not to compare the different measures. The point is to test whether any of the measures yields a salience pattern that, being used as level-0 in CI's level-k model, would allow that model to account for the hide-and-seek game data.
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The first three experiments are measures of primary, secondary, and infinity-order salience, keeping the game description out. The fourth-to-sixth measures use the secondary-salience measure to explore the effect of introducing the game story (and whether an asymmetry follows from different player roles). Measures seven and eight provide alternative measures of primary salience with and without the hide-and-seek story, and measure nine is an alternative measure of secondary salience. To be precise, I look at the following experiments 3 :
Picking Task. Asking people to choose one of four boxes labelled ''A'', ''B'', ''A'', and ''A'' (Bardsley et al.,'s 2010 measure of primary salience), on a separate page of a post-experimental questionnaire (containing mostly items from the 16PF personality inventory) after an unrelated experiment. As a crucial complementary measure, I record response times for this task.
Guessing Task. Asking participants to estimate the relative click frequencies from the Picking Task (Bardsley et al.,'s 2010 measure of secondary salience).
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Beauty Contest. A beauty contest anchored in the question ''which is the most salient box, which are the second, third, and fourth most salient boxes?'' Conducted as a classroom experiment in the Experimental Methods course.
5
Post-H&S Guessing. A Guessing Task after participants had played the hide-and-seek game but before they got any feedback.
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PostCoord Guessing. A Guessing Task after participants had played a coordination game on the A-B-A-A frame.
PostDiscoord Guessing. A Guessing Task after participants had played a discoordination game on the A-B-A-A frame.
Rating Task. Asking participants to rate the salience of each of the four boxes on an 11-point Likert scale (''extremely inconspicuous'' to ''extremely conspicuous'').
Post-Story Rating. A Rating Task conducted after explaining the hide-and-seek game in a role-neutral format. Post-Story Rate-Guessing. A Guessing Task on the average Post-Story Rating conducted after explaining the hideand-seek game in a role-neutral format.
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None of the participants participated in more than one of the nine experiments. 3 A translated version of the instructions to each task is provided in Appendix C.
4 If no frequency differed from the true value by more than 5% (10%/20%), participants earned 50 (25/10) Euro cents; the first of several (unknown) tasks participants faced in the experiment. 5 Amongst those stating the modal ordering, a prize of 12 Euros (USD 15.60) was raffled off. 6 Incentives as in the Guessing Task.
7 Participants did not play the game itself.
8 We used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) , ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) , and hroot (Bock et al., 2014) .
Results of the experiments
The results of the nine salience-elicitation experiments are reported in Table 1 , together with the respective numbers of independent observations. Observation 1. B (2) is the most salient alternative, and A (4) is not more salient than A (3) . Hence, Crawford and Iriberri's salienceseeking level-0 is mis-specified in terms of both the most salient and the least salient location.
For the first part, look at the second data column in Table 1 
Model fit under the elicited salience patterns
I use the three elicited salience patterns as level-0 of a level-k model (instead of CI's A (1) A (4) B (2) A (3) ), and repeat CI's maximumlikelihood estimation for the three new models on the same data they used.
11 Additionally, I estimated three 'hybrid' models in which level-0 follows primary salience and higher k-levels are determined by the corresponding secondary-salience measure. Table 2 presents the results. The hybrid model building on the Picking-Task data coincides with Lk-B (2) A (3) A (1) A (4) in Table 2 , while the model building on the Rating Task performs insubstantially worse than the reported model Lk-hyb-B (2) A (3) A (1) A (4) .
12 To respond to the objection that salience may be influenced by culture but that the salience measures were obtained in a different country than the hide-and-seek data, I also include the model estimates for the hide-and-seek data from Heinrich and Wolff (2012) . 
4) (from Post-Story Rate-Guessing) in the list of salience patterns. 11 The only (merely technical) difference is that I found the maximum-likelihood estimates by performing a complete grid search over all possible type-distributions (at the percent level) rather than using an algorithm. 12 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the 'hybrid' models.
13 For comparability, I include only the data obtained under the original instructions. Compared to the data CI use, this data has the additional advantage that it was obtained exclusively in the ABAA-frame, so that no further assumptions are needed of how to translate salience patterns from other settings, such as from the 1234-frame.
Table 1
Salience assessments of the four boxes denoted by ''A'', ''B'', ''A'', and ''A''. Table 2 Log-likelihoods and mean squared errors of the maximum-likelihood estimates of the indicated models. ''RTH'' refers to Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller's collected studies, whose data is reproduced in Table 3 of Crawford and Iriberri (2007) . ''HW'' refers to Heinrich and Wolff (2012) . The data from both studies is provided in Appendix A. Observation 3. The measured-salience-based estimates for CI's model do not fit the data, and outperfrom the mixed-strategy Nash prediction only unsubstantially.
RTH's data HW's data
Observation 3 can be verified by a look at the mean squared errors in the right-most column in Table 2 , comparing the specification Lk-B (2) A (3) A (1) A (4) to specification Lk-A (1) A (4) B (2) A (3) and to that of the mixed-strategy equilibrium. The result is even stronger for RTH's data, in the central column of Table 2 . Contrary to what we should expect, none of the estimated level-k distributions is hump-shaped. 
Discussion
The results presented here pose another serious challenge to the salience-based level-k model. This is despite the fact that I have 14 See Table B .3 in Appendix B.
been rather lenient with the theory, by allowing also higher-order salience to be a level-0 candidate. Nonetheless, even under these forgiving conditions, the salience-based level-k model cannot account even for the hide-and-seek game data it was constructed for. Unfortunately, this means we are left without an explanation for the data other than Rubinstein et al.'s (1997) -unsatisfactory -account of participants choosing ''a naïve strategy (avoiding the endpoints), that is not guided by valid strategic reasoning''.
